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Aktivitas Ofensif Rusia dalam Konflik Ukraina Tahun 2022

*Ni Nyoman Dinda Ayudya Putri Kirana  -  Department of International Relations, Universitas Pembangunan Nasional “Veteran” Jawa Timur, Indonesia

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Abstract

Perkembangan teknologi digital telah mengubah dinamika konflik internasional, dengan ruang siber muncul sebagai domain strategis kelima di samping darat, laut, udara, dan antariksa. Meskipun berbagai aktivitas ofensif di ruang siber sering dikategorikan sebagai "perang siber," Thomas Rid (2012) berargumen bahwa perang siber belum pernah terjadi di masa lalu, tidak sedang terjadi saat ini, dan kecil kemungkinannya akan terjadi di masa depan karena seluruh serangan siber bermotif politik hanyalah versi canggih dari tiga bentuk aktivitas ofensif, yaitu sabotage, espionage, dan subversion. Penelitian ini bertujuan menganalisis bentuk-bentuk aktivitas ofensif yang dilakukan Rusia dalam konflik dengan Ukraina pada tahun 2022 menggunakan kerangka konseptual Thomas Rid. Penelitian menggunakan pendekatan studi kasus kualitatif dengan data sekunder dari literatur akademik, laporan pemerintah, dan publikasi intelijen keamanan siber. Temuan menunjukkan bahwa aktivitas ofensif Rusia termanifestasi dalam tiga bentuk: sabotage melalui penyebaran wiper malware destruktif yang menargetkan sistem pemerintahan dan teknis Ukraina; espionage melalui kampanye pencurian kredensial dan pengintaian digital oleh kelompok yang berafiliasi dengan GRU; serta subversion melalui kampanye disinformasi sistematis, amplifikasi bot farm, dan teknologi deepfake. Temuan ini mengkonfirmasi argumen Rid bahwa aktivitas ofensif lebih tepat dipahami sebagai sabotage, espionage, dan subversion daripada perang dalam pengertian Clausewitzian.


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Keywords: Aktivitas Ofensif; Sabotage; Espionage; Subversion; Konflik Rusia–Ukraina
Funding: Universitas Pembangunan Nasional “Veteran” Jawa Timur

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Language : IN
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